Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries

Law Journals

4-28-2016

State v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct. (Ayden A.), 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 33
(April 28, 2016)
Audra Powell
Nevada Law Journal

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs
Part of the Civil Law Commons, Family Law Commons, and the Health Law and Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
Powell, Audra, "State v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct. (Ayden A.), 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 33 (April 28, 2016)" (2016).
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries. 959.
https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs/959

This Case Summary is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law, an institutional repository
administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please
contact youngwoo.ban@unlv.edu.

State v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct. (Ayden A.), 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 33 (April 28, 2016)1
FAMILY LAW-CIVIL PROCEDURE
Summary

NRS 432B.6075 governs emergency admission of children with emotional disturbances
to facilities for their protection, and requires a petition for continuance of admission after an
emergency admission within five days of the involuntary placement.2 Based on N.R.C.P. 6(a),
which governs the computing of time for judicial purposes, the Court held that the five day
limitation on filing a petition was based on judicial, not calendar, days. The Court granted the
State’s petition for a writ of mandamus, directing the district court to vacate its order denying the
State’s NRS 432B petition.
Background

Ayden A., a minor, was admitted to West Hills Hospital because he was deemed to be
emotionally disturbed. Exactly one week later, the State filed a petition, pursuant to NRS
Chapter 432B, to extend emergency admission. The next day, at a hearing on the petition, the
State argued that the five day statutory limit meant business days; Ayden argued that the petition
was untimely because the statutory limit meant calendar days. The district court ruled in favor of
Ayden. Ayden was subsequently released.
Discussion

This case presents an issue that is capable of repetition yet evading review
The State argued that the Court should hear its case, because although the instant matter
was moot, the underlying issue of law needed clarification. The Court noted that a moot issue
may be considered on appeal if the issue met the following factors: "(1) the duration of the
challenged action is relatively short, (2) there is a likelihood that a similar issue will arise in the
future, and (3) the matter is important."3 The Court held that the current issue fell within the
exception because of the necessarily temporary time frame of the involuntary admissions; the
likelihood that the State, if not Ayden, would need to rely on a correct interpretation of the
statutory time limit; and because the interpretation of the time limit could affect individual
liberty, it was deemed important.
“5 days” in NRS 432B.0675 are necessarily judicial days
The Court noted that the text of the statute did not indicate a computation method for the
time limit, and thus declared the case a matter of statutory interpretation. As the computation
method for time limits in Nevada is laid out in NRCP 6(a), the Court agreed that it would apply
to NRS 432B. "NRCP 6(a), by its own terms, applies to the computation of any period of time
prescribed or allowed by the NRCP, local rules of the district court, by an order of the court, or
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by any applicable statute.”4 The Court noted that there are exceptions under which NRCP 6(a)
would not apply, but only if the statute specifically conflicts with NRCP 6(a).5 The Court noted
that it had considered legislative intent, which it admitted “might support Ayden's position that
the Legislature intended the five-day cap to refer to calendar days” but concluded that NRCP 6(a)
should apply.
Conclusion

Because the district court applied the improper calculation of time to the State’s NRS
432B petition, and thus denied it as untimely, the Court granted the State’s petition for a writ of
mandamus and ordered the district court to vacate its order.
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